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Case No 20090958-CA

In fyt 28taF) Court of Appeals
Murray City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
-v-

S. Steven Maese,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(a) (2009). The Appellant, S. Steven Maese, appeals a GRAMA judicial review.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
POINT I.

Under GRAMA, parties have 30 days to seek judicial review of a Records

Committee order; upon filing a complaint, the review is governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Here, Murray City appealed a Committee order. Maese filed a counterclaim
17 days after Murray's complaint, but more than 30 days after the Committee Order.
The trial court dismissed the counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction. Must counterclaims
be filed within 30 days of the Committee's order or within 20 days of a complaint?

~1~

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

A "district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that [this
Court will] review for correctness/'1 Also, "Interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is a question of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness/'2
Maese preserved this issue by opposing the Committee's Motion to Dismiss.3
POINT II.

Under GRAMA, the Utah State Records Committee is a necessary party to

any judicial review from one of its orders. Yet the Committee cannot advocate for its
decision to be upheld or overturned. Here, the Committee filed a Motion to Dismiss Mr.
Maese's counterclaim, which the trial court granted. In a judicial review of its decision,
does the Committee have standing to file motions or pleadings?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

For standing, this Court reviews "legal determinations for correctness, affording deference for factual determinations that bear upon the question of standing, but minimal
deference to the district court's application of the facts to the law."4
Maese preserved this issue by questioning the Committee's standing in his Memorandum Opposing the Committee's Motion to Dismiss.5

1

State v. Tooele City, 2002 UT 8, t 8,44 P.3d 680.

2

Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, 1 7,141 P.3d 629.

3 R. at 128A.
4

Cedar ML EnvtL, Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, % 7, 214 P.3d 95 (quotes omitted).

5 R. at 128A.

RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This Court's interpretation of the following rule and statute is important to the issues on
appeal and their full texts are attached at ADDENDUM A:
RULES

•

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a).

STATUTES

•

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404.

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E C A S E
On February 21, 2008 Steven Maese made a GRAMA request of Murray City for copies
of "All records of sustained discipline of Murray City Police Officers, for which all time
periods for administrative appeal have expired, for the last 5 years." 6
Murray denied the request.
On March 4, 2008, Maese appealed the City Attorney's decision to the Murray
Mayor. 7 On April 2, 2008, the Mayor's Office denied Maese's appeal. 8
Maese appealed that decision to the Utah State Records Committee. On June 19, 2008
the Committee partially granted Maese's appeal. 9

|

On July 11, 2008 Murray petitioned the Third District Court for a de novo judicial review of the Committee's decision. 10 On July 28, 2008, Maese filed his Amended Answer
and Counterclaim. 11

6

R. at 9.

7

Rat 11.

8

R. at 12.

9

R. at 29.
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On August 13, 2008, the Committee filed its Motion to Dismiss Defendant Maese's
Counterclaim.12 On August 18, 2008 Murray joined the Committee's motion.13
On August 18, 2008, Maese moved the trial court to quash the Committee's motion
to dismiss because it lacked standing.14
On December 18, 2008, the trial court issued its Order which granted the Committee's motion to dismiss "based upon the Court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over
Mr. Maese's untimely filed appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2~404(l)(a);"15
In the same order, the Court denied Maese's motion to quash the Committee's motion; de facto holding it had standing to bring the motion.16
On October 13, 2009, the trial court entered its final order and commanded Murray
to release unredacted records to Mr. Maese. Yet it ruled that "The dismissal of Mr.
Maese's Counterclaim was on the merits, which prevents Mr. Maese from reasserting
his requests.. ."17 It concluded with "The Court orders plaintiff to disclose the names of
the officers to Mr. Maese in full. The Court orders Mr. Maese to limit his use of the
records and names by not publishing them nor disclosing them any further."18

10

R. at 1.

11

R. at 75.

12

R. at 113.

13

R. at 144.

14

R.atl28A.

15

R. at 3931f2.

16

R. at 393 1 3.

17

R. at 693-707; R. at 694 specifically.

18

R. at 706.

r«^ A

r+*j

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although disciplinary records are listed under the GRAMA heading " Records that
must be disclosed," Murray City denied Steven Maese's GRAMA request for access to
police discipline records twice and attempted to deny him access two additional
times.19 Despite this, Murray gave Maese discipline records with officer's names redacted.
Maese appealed Murray's denial to the Utah State Records Committee, which partially granted his appeal and ordered Murray to release its police discipline records
with the names intact.20
Unsatisfied with the outcome, Murray petitioned the Third District Court for a judicial review of the Committee's decision.21 Maese counterclaimed and asked the trial
court for a permanent injunction restraining Murray from violating GRAMA and asked
for costs and fees—both sanctioned under GRAMA.22
Yet the Committee filed a motion to dismiss Maese's counterclaim as untimely and
based on the Committee's motion, the trial court dismissed Maese's counterclaim.23
Ultimately, the trial court ordered Murray to provide Maese with records which disclosed officer names, but held the Maese was barred from asking for witness names be-

19

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-301; R. at 9 and 11.

20

R. at 29.

21

R.atl.

22

R. at 75; Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-802.

23

R. at 15.
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cause his counterclaim had been dismissed. Maese never received a permenant injunction against Murray, nor did he receive costs and fees.24

SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T
POINT I.

The trial court held that GRAMA required Maese to file his counterclaim

within 30 days of the Utah State Records Committee's order. This ruling fails to account
for Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(5) which states that once a party files a petition for
judicial review in a GRAMA case, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern all further
proceedings. Given that, the Rules permitted Maese to file his counterclaims within 20
days of receiving a complaint. Maese filed his counterclaim 17 days after Murray's
complaint. Accordingly, Maese timely filed his counterclaim.
Furthermore the "reluctant litigant" theory— that defendants who take a "wait and
see" approach to further litigation should not be penalized for trying to avoid a lawsuit—holds that Maese timely filed his counterclaim.
POINT II.

The Utah State Records Committee cannot advocate for either party in a

judicial review of its decision, not even to uphold its ruling. Therefore, without a protectable interest in the judicial review of its decisions, the Committee lacks standing to
file motions or pleadings; it cannot attack parties' claims or defenses. Because the
Committee is without standing in judicial review of its decisions, its motion to dismiss
was invalid. This Court should prevent the Committee from filing further pleadings in
this case and future judicial reviews of the Committee's orders.

24

R. at 706.
~ ^ ~

ARGUMENT
POINT I. The Rules of Civil Procedure —not GRAMA—govern counterclaims and
therefore Maese timely filed his counterclaim.
Murray City petitioned the trial court for judicial review of the Utah State Records
Committee's order within 30 days. As permitted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
12(a), Maese filed a counterclaim 17 days later. Still, the trial court dismissed Maese's
counterclaim as untimely under GRAMA.25
The trial court's ruling was incorrect for two reasons: (1) Once Murray filed its petition for judicial review the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governed the matter, allowing
a party 20 days to file a counterclaim; and (2) analogous precedent holds that Maese
cannot be penalized for being a reluctant litigant.
A. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern judicial review of GRAMA appeals. The Rules allowed Maese 20 days to file a counterclaim, and he did so
within that time. Therefore his counterclaim was timely.
No statute or court rules allowed the trial court to find Maese's counterclaim untimely.
Under GRAMA's plain language, Utah Court Rules govern judicial review and permitted Maese to file his counterclaim 17 days after Murray filed its complaint.
GRAMA requires parties to petition a district court for judicial review of Utah State
Records Committee order within 30 days of the order.26 Additionally, after a party initiates a judicial review complaint, GRAMA requires " All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."27

25

R. at 393.

26

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(l).

27

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(5).
~
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In this case, Murray timely petitioned the trial court for judicial review of the Committee's order. Maese counterclaimed 17 days later, but more than 30 days after the
Committee's order.
In Harley Davidson ofN. Utah v. Workforce Appeals Bd., the Utah Supreme Court stated
that appellate timeliness requirements exist "in order to bring a measure of finality to
the orders entered in [] administrative agencies/ 728 Murray, by filing a complaint for
judicial review, notified all parties that this matter had not achieved the finality referenced to in Harley Davidson.
And once Murray filed its petition for judicial review, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governed the action. 29 Also, because district courts review GRAMA decisions de
novo, counterclaims are the only mechanism to invoke causes of action specified by
GRAMA for district court action —such as attorney's fees and injuctions. 30 Therefore,
Maese's only method of seeking relief against Murray was through a counterclaim.
Under this statutory scheme, Maese's counterclaim was timely.
B. GRAMA's 30 day judicial review requirement is a statute of limitations. Under Utah law, counterclaims arising from transactions alleged in complaints
are not barred by a statute of limitations. Maese'rs counterclaim was timely.
Under Utah law, counterclaims are immune to a statute of limitations if the counterclaim arises from the transaction described in the complaint and the counterclaims were
within the statute of limitations when plaintiff filed the complaint. This holding protects

28

Harley Davidson ofN. Utah v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT 38, f 9,116 P.3d 349.

29

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(5).

30

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-802.
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defendants from plaintiffs who may attempt to game the judicial system and also protects reluctant litigants bring claims only upon being sued.
Regarding this doctrine, in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, the Utah Supreme Court held:
a counterclaim which arises out of the transaction alleged in the complaint and is
in existence, at the time the complaint is filed, and is not then barred by a statute
of limitations, will not be barred by the running of the statutory time thereafter.
The statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed.31
Here, Maese meets the above criteria perfectly: His counterclaim arose from the
Murray GRAMA matter and it was not barred at the time Murray filed its complaints.
Beyond the Supreme Court's holdings in Doxey-Layton, this Court in Moffitt v. Ban,
enumerated sound policy considerations bolstering this holding:
Doxey-Layton sought to eliminate the possibility that plaintiffs might escape
counterclaim liability by filing complaints at the eleventh hour of a counterclaim's limitations period, leaving defendants with insufficient time to assert
counterclaims before that period expired.
This Court then explained its "reluctant litigant" theory and why reluctant litigants
are granted wide latitude:
.. .[This] allows reluctant litigants to take a "wait and see" attitude in litigation,
and delay filing their claims until (and unless) the opposing party brings suit. If a
party files a complaint against a reluctant litigant, the reluctant litigant may then
assert his or her own right to relief in the form of a counterclaim. However, if the
other party is also reluctant to bring suit, and does not file a complaint, the reluctant litigant is spared any involvement in litigation—he need not file his own action as the only means of preserving his latent claims for relief....
The trial court's ruling guts the reluctant litigant theory in GRAMA appeals. It allows governmental entities to wait until the eleventh hour to file a complaint for judicial
review which would then bar citizens from seeking attorney's fees and injunctions. This
31

Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976).

~

9
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avenue of action has no downside for governmental entities and will become standard
procedure unless this Court reinstates Maese's counterclaim.
POINT II. The Utah State Records Committee lacks standing to participate in judicial review of its decision. Therefore, the trial court should not have
considered the Committee's Motion to Dismiss.
A. Administrative

agencies cannot litigate injudicial reviews of its orders.

Utah law holds that agencies performing quasi-judicial functions lack standing to participate in appeals of their own decisions.
In Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, this Court wrote:
[A]bsent a positive legislative grant of authority to [an agency] to defend its decisions,.. . [An agency] exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, not being a
party to its proceedings, and not having any legal interest in maintaining its determination, can neither appeal from a[n]... order of a court reversing the proceedings nor be heard on appeal. 32
As defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Dep]tofBus. Regulation v. Public Sew.
Common, the Utah State Records Committee is a quasi-judicial body because it is "one
involving the exercise of discretion and requiring notice and hearing/ 733
Accordingly, the Committee could not be heard in Mr. Maese's appeal. Yet the trial
court accepted the Committee's motions and improperly granted its motion to dismiss.
B. The Committee lacks standing in judicial review of its orders under both
Utah's traditional and alternative standing tests.
Standing ensures that courts confine themselves resolving disputes most effectively resolved through the judicial process. 34 In Utah, parties must establish standing either
through the Traditional test or the Alternative test.
32

Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 488,1 25,128 P.3d 1204.

33

Utah Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. Public Sew. Commn, 614 P.2d 1242,1253 (Utah 1980).

~10~

Under the Traditional test, the Committee lacks standing. In Sierra Club v. Sevier
Power Co., the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the traditional standing test criteria:
.. .the petitioning party must allege that it has suffered or will"suffer[] some distinct and palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute/'... When determining whether a party has suffered a distinct and
palpable injury, we engage in a three-step inquiry.... First, the party must assert
that it has been or will be "adversely affected by the [challenged] actions."...
Second, the party must allege a causal relationship "between the injury to the
party, the [challenged] actions and the relief requested."... Third, the relief requested must be "substantially likely to redress the injury claimed."... If the party can satisfy these three criteria, the party has standing to pursue its claims
before the courts of this state. 35
And the Committee concedes, in a judicial review of one of its decisions it cannot
advocate for one litigant over another. In its Answer to Maese's Counterclaim, the
Committee states that "Neither the granting nor denial of the relief requested by the Defendant, Steven Maese, would have an effect on any legal interest of the [Committee]." 36
The Committee's concession ends the test analysis and the Committee is estopped
from asserting standing on appeal. Furthermore, the Committee is estopped from claiming standing under the alternative test because it has failed to claim alternative standing
in the trial court. Without standing, the trial court should have ignored the Committee.
*

*

*

Because the Committee lacks standing, the trial court should not have considered its
motion to dismiss Maese's counterclaim. Maese asks that this Court prohibit the Committee from filing future pleadings and motions in GRAMA appeals.
34

Sierra Club v. Sevier Power Co., 2006 UT 74, f 17,148 P.3d 960.

35

Sierra Club v. Sevier Power Co., 2006 UT 7 4 , f 1 9 , 1 4 8 P.3d 960.

36

R. at 103.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,

Mr. Maese respectfully requests this Court reverse the trial court's dismis-

sal of his counterclaim, reinstating it. He also asks that the Court hold that the Utah
State Records Committee participation in judicial reviews of its orders is in name only.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

on this 27 th day of May, 2010.

S. Steven Maese
Appellant Pro Se

CERTIFICATE of SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 27 th day of May, 2010, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to:
Andrew M. Morse
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 521-9000 p

^ Hand D d
i—Ur^ ^ .i
g Overnight Mail
h
"—'

S
Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 366-0533 p
(801) 366-0144 f

^ * * ^ f ™Y
LJ U.S. Mail
U Overnight Mail
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RULE 12 - DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and
complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The
plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after
service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of
the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:

63G-2-404. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Title 63G —General Government
Chapter 2—Government Records Access and Management Act
Section 404—Judicial review.
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial
review by the district court of the records committee's order.
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the records
committee's order.
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review.
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served with notice of
the petition in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a governmental entity's determination as specified in Subsection 63G-2-402(l)(b).
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than:
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by
either providing the requested records or denying the request in whole or in
part;
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond
to the request; or
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if:
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63G-2-401(l)(b) occur; and
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63G-2-401.
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and shall contain:
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address;
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a prior appeal to the records committee;

(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that issued the initial
determination with a copy of that determination;
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief.
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the court shall allow the claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the
claim of business confidentiality.
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be in camera.
(7) The court shall:
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence presented to the
records committee;
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity.
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and
public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the
disclosure of information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the
interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the requester's use and
further disclosure of the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of
private or controlled records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records
protected under Subsections 63G-2-305(l) and (2), and privacy interests or the public
interest in the case of other protected records.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MURRAY CITY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
CASE NO. 080912185

S. STEVEN MAESE, and the UTAH
STATE RECORDS COMM.,
Defendants.

Judge Michele M. Christiansen

Pending before this Court are Defendant S. Steven Maese's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement and Mr. Maese's Motion to
Strike. Mr. Maese filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on July 20, 2009; Defendant,
the Utah State Records Committee, opposed the motion August 3, 2009; Plaintiff opposed
the motion in a combined memorandum supporting its own Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 4, 2009. Mr. Maese then filed a combined Opposition to Plaintiffs
Cross-Motion and a Reply in support of his motion on August 5, 2009 and Plaintiff filed a
Reply in support of its Cross-Motion on August 12, 2009. On August 7, 2009, Mr. Maese
filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, which Plaintiff opposed
August 10, 2009. The Court having reviewed all relevant pleadings and documents on
file in this matter, hereby rules as follows.

I.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM WAS TIMELY
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition and in Support of the Cross-Motion was

timely under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 6 and 7. Weekend days and the Pioneer Day
Holiday are not considered in calculating the ten days Plaintiff had to file it's opposition
to the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Maese filed his Motion July 20, 2009, so the
Memorandum in Opposition was due August 4, 2009, which was the day Plaintiff filed it.
Mr. Maese's Motion to Strike is DENIED.

II.

DEFENDANT MAESE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
On December 15, 2008, the Court granted Defendant Utah State Records

Committee's Motion to Dismiss Mr. Maese's Counterclaim as untimely. The
Counterclaim requested disclosure of the names of witnesses reported in the disciplinary
records. Mr. Maese's motion for summary judgment again asks for full disclosure of the
redacted officer and witness names. The dismissal of Mr. Maese's Counterclaim was on
the merits, which prevents Mr. Maese from reasserting his requests for the witness names.
Mr. Maese's Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it requests disclosure of
the un-redacted names of the witnesses is DENIED.

Mr. Maese's Motion is GRANTED in part, as it pertains to his request for the
disclosure of the officers' name, based on the following.
M.

PLAINTIFFS CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

An in Camera Review of the Records is Unnecessary to the
Court's Determination of Whether the Records Should be
Disclosed.

Plaintiff has disclosed the records of discipline that Mr. Maese requested, with the
names of witnesses and the offending officers redacted. Plaintiff claims that the Utah
Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), specifically Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-2-404, requires that the Court review the officers names to determine
whether to disclose them. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs interpretation of this
statute, which states in part:
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be
in camera.
(8)(a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various
interests and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or
nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information properly classified as
private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the
interest favoring restriction of access.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-404(6) & (8)(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff reads the
requirement in Section (8)(a) that the Court consider and weigh the pertinent interests and
policies as necessitating the Court's review of the officers' names. However, the plain
-3-

language of Section (6) gives the Court the discretion to review the disputed records. See
State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, U 18 (citing Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102,1j
18 stating "[w]hen examining a statute, we first look to its plain language/'). Thus, if the
Court determines a review of the un-redacted records is necessary in its consideration of
relevant interests and policies then the Court may review them. Conversely, if the Court
determines it can make the required determination and balance the competing interests
without reviewing the records, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(6) authorizes it to do so.
Not reviewing the officers' names does not render Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404
"meaningless" as Plaintiff assert. A court's determination not to review disputed records
in no way entitles a court to sidestep the balancing test GRAMA requires, it is simply
discretionary as to whether reviewing the records would abet that balancing.
The Court finds that reviewing the officers' names is unnecessary to determine if
their names should be disclosed to Mr. Maese. The officer's individual names mean
nothing to the Court nor would it be appropriate for the Court to employ any outside
knowledge of the officer's names to determine whether disclosure would be appropriate.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not indicated why all or even one of the officers' names should be
relevant to the Court's decision. The Court must evaluate the competing interests and
public policies regarding disclosure, and whether Plaintiff properly classified the records,
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based on their content, not based on the officer's names or who the officers are.
The Court also finds that the officers' names are irrelevant to its determination that
disclosure of the names does not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. The privacy interests in disciplinary reports are not particular to individual
officers. The Court sees no reason why the officers' names would or could be relevant to
its determination as to whether to disclose them to Mr. Maese. Plaintiffs request that the
Court hold an in camera review of the un-redacted names is DENIED.
B.

Plaintiff has not Met its Burden to Show it Properly Classified
the Disputed Records as Protected or as Private,

When Plaintiff received Mr. Maese's request, GRAMA required it to conduct a
"conscientious and neutral assessment" of his request, "taking into account die entire
scope of GRAMA, including its expressions of legislative intent, its presumptions
favoring access, and its mandate that when competing interests fight to a draw, disclosure
wins." Deseret News Publ Co. v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 26, H 24. GRAMA
prevents a government entity from presuming "that a requested record has been properly
classified and then proceed[ing] to canvass GRAMA for statutory language that confirms
its designation." Id. In the case of records of discipline, however, GRAMA provides
specific classifications and exceptions to their designation as public, private or protected.
Specifically, GRAMA designates as public "records that would disclose information
-5-

relating to formal charges or disciplinary actions against a past or present governmental
entity employee if: (i) the disciplinary action has been completed and all time periods for
administrative appeal have expired; and (ii) the charges on which the disciplinary action
was based were sustained/' Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-301(3)(o). There are exceptions to
this designation, and where "a record is expressly exempt from disclosure, access may be
restricted." Id. at 301(3). Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305 provides exceptions:
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental
entity:
(9) [R]ecords created or maintained for . . . discipline purposes if release of
the records:
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or
registration purposes;
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits,
disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings;
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair
trial or impartial hearing;
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source
who is not generally known outside of government and, in the case
of a record compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose
information furnished by a source not generally known outside of
government if disclosure would compromise the source; or
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known
-6-

outside of government if disclosure would interfere with
enforcement or audit efforts.
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that contain a
personal recommendation concerning an individual if disclosure
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
or disclosure is not in the public interest.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-305(9)(a) - (e) & 63G-2-305(25). Plaintiff also claims it
properly classified the records as "private" under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d).
By asserting that these statutes justify its classification of the records as protected
and as private, Plaintiff must show it performed a conscientious and neutral assessment of
the records and that 1) it properly classified the records as protected or private; 2) the
records contain a personal recommendation and 3) disclosure would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or that disclosure is not in the public interest.

i.

Plaintiff did not Properly Classify the Records as Protected
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(9).

The primary problem with Plaintiffs classification of these records as protected is
that it has disclosed the records themselves with only the names redacted. While this
might signify the privacy interests of the individual officers are particularly important, it
undermines any argument that the actual content of the records is private. In fact,
disclosure of the content of the reports eliminates the need for the Court to consider
-7-

whether §§ 63G-2-305(9)(a), (b) or (e), as those factors pertain to the content of the
reports and not to the rights of the particular individuals.1 Utah Code Ann. §
63G-2-305(9)(d) is also not at issue as the officers' are not sources of information in these
reports and the Court has ruled that the witnesses' names cannot be disclosed.
This leaves only Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(9)(c) for the Court to consider;
whether disclosure "would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair trial or
impartial hearing." The Court has no evidence disclosure of the names would affect these
officers' rights to fair trials or impartial hearings. Nor is it clear how such rights could be
affected by disclosing the names associated with Mr. Maese's request for "[a]U records of
sustained discipline of Murray City Police Officers, for which all time periods for
administrative appeal have expired, for the last 5 years." Mr. Maese requested records of
final disciplinary actions and Plaintiff agrees the officers' right to administrative appeal
expired for the records it disclosed. The discipline has concluded. Plaintiff has not
shown any reason why these rights would or could be affected by disclosure of the names

1

Plaintiffs only attempt to address the statutory exceptions is the claim that the reports
are protected because they "address internal investigations and discipline, Murray City
investigative techniques, and personnel evaluations concerning individuals employed by Murray
City." Pl/s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 7-8. Even if the Court found it necessary to consider factors
(a), (b) or (e), Plaintiffs disclosure of the reports of "internal investigations . . . investigative
techniques" belies plaintiffs claim that the information itself should be protected. The names of
officers have no bearing on the investigations or techniques.
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and disclosure of the names is not prevented by this statute and Plaintiff has not properly
classified them as protected.

ii.

Plaintiff did not Properly Classify the Records as Protected
Under Utah Code Ann. §63G-2-305(25), nor as Private
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-305(25) and 63G-2-302(2)(d) both allow government
entities to classify records as private or protected, under different circumstances, if
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(9)(d)
To protect records from disclosure under this statute, they must be "records, other
than personnel evaluations, that contain a personal recommendation concerning an
individual if disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, or disclosure is not in the public interest." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(25).
Mr. Maese disputes the relevance of this statute to these records and argues because they
do not contain personal recommendations it does not apply. Plaintiff counters that
because "the documents constitute investigations into allegations of misconduct, findings,
recommendations, and imposition of punishment" they meet this exception.
The Court agrees that the disciplinary records cannot be construed as personal
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recommendations. The letters detail the infractions each officer committed, the hearing
process each officer has been through, the consequences of the actions, and each letter
gives the officer notice that disciplinary actions are cumulative and that the letters will
become part of the officers' files. There is no recommendation or positive connotation in
the letters. In stark contrast to a personal recommendation, which is something one seeks
for praise, not punishment. A "recommendation"is: "[t]he act of recommending;
[something that recommends, especially a favorable statement concerning character or
qualifications; [something, such as a course of action, that is recommended." The
American Heritage Dictionary of the American Language (4th ed. 2009), To evaluate
someone is "[t]o ascertain or fix the value or worth of; [or t]o examine and judge
carefully; appraise." Id.
Plaintiff faults Mr. Maese for not citing law or statute to support his claim, but
neither "personal recommendation" nor "personnel evaluation" is defined in the Utah
Code, Utah case law has not addressed the meaning of the words in the GRAMA context,
nor are the terms ambiguous. The records informing officers of disciplinary action cannot
be construed as personal recommendations and the exception provided in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-2-305(9)(d) is inapplicable to these records.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d)
Records may also be properly classified as private if they are "records containing
data on individuals the disclosure of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy."2 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d). This statute is less restrictive
and clearly encompasses data such as police officers' names. The Court does not defer to
Plaintiffs classification of these records simply because they contain data. After
balancing the relevant privacy interests against the public interests warranting disclosure,
the Court finds that disclosure of the officers' names will not constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
GRAMA's private and protected classification of records that 'constitute^
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' does not sanction
denying access to a record merely because it invades personal privacy. To
qualify for nonpublic classification a record must not only invade personal
privacy, it must do so in a 'clearly unwarranted' manner.
Deseret News, 2008 UT 26, ^ 30 (citing a former version of the statute Utah Code Ann. §
63-2-302(2)(d); and United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177 (1991)).
The invasion of privacy is not unwarranted because the officers were disciplined
2

The Utah Supreme Court has found that this statute is "a puzzling and circular condition
to impose on a record, the proper classification of which depends upon whether its disclosure
constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. .. .While this statutory language
remains an enigma to us, we are satisfied that it does not give us cause to defer to the County's
primary classification of the . . . record." Deseret News, 2008 UT 26, \ 29 n. 5.
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because of his or her misconduct as a police officer. City police officers are public and
government officials held to particular standards of conduct and given official duties.
Officers can be sanctioned for noncompliance with their official duties or standards of
conduct. It is in the public interest to know when a police officer has abused or violated
those duties. Even where two officers were off duty, they were disciplined for involving
a police vehicle in their misconduct and for conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
Another officer was disciplined for damaging police equipment; another for sleeping on
duty and others were disciplined for using profane language while on duty or at official
events. Disclosure of the names associated with the discipline reports will clarify which
officers committed which infractions in the performance of their official duties.
Additionally, the privacy interest a police officer has in the disclosure of her or his
name is far less than the privacy interest an officer has in a birth date, a home address or a
social security number, which GRAMA protects and which could allow someone to find
criminal records, commit identity fraud or otherwise infringe on the officer's privacy
beyond learning about official discipline. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(l)(f)
(classifying as private "employment records concerning a current or former employee of,
or applicant for employment with, a governmental entity that would disclose that
individual's home address, home telephone number, Social Security number, insurance
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coverage, marital status, or payroll deductions"); and see Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 48 v. KPNX Broad. Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 302 (Ariz. 1998) (finding "a person, including
a public school teacher, has a privacy interest in his or her birth date."). Unlike this
sensitive information, police officers' names are broadcast to the public on a badge on the
officers' chests. As officials who interact with the public daily, the officers' names are
essential to their duties. It would be contrived to now prevent the disclosure of their
names, particularly when disclosure is associated with their official duties. Plaintiffs have
not established that disclosure would cause more than minor embarrassment about past
events. Embarrassment does not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of these
officers' privacy nor is it justification to prevent disclosure of their names. See Deseret
News, 2008 UT 26, \ 40. The officers' embarrassment can be limited by controlling the
disclosure of these names and Mr. Maese's use of them.
In conclusion, after weighing and balancing the competing interests at stake in the
disclosure of these officers' names, the Court finds that because of the officers' public
roles and duties and because Plaintiff has not properly classified the names of the officers
as protected or as private, that the names are public and Mr. Maese has a right to them as
a matter of law. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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C.

The Court Orders Disclosure of the Names of the Police Officers
to Defendant S. Steven Maese and Orders Defendant S. Steven
Maese to Limit His Use of the Names of the Officers,

The Court orders plaintiff to disclose the names of the officers to Mr. Maese in
full. The Court orders Mr. Maese to limit his use of the records and names by not
publishing them nor disclosing them any further.

This is the final Order of the Court.

DATED this / \j day of October, 2009.

BY THE COURT:

MicheleM. Christiansen^
r
DISTRICT JUDGE
/
.''Kr
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